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plaintiff had been forged. These stocks \\'PrP: 
Knickerbocker Fund, Mountain Fuel Supply Co., and 
Commercial Credit Co. 
The signature of the plaintiff on the earlier stock 
certificates had also been forged with the exception 
of the signature on one stock certificate. All of thr 
transactions concerning the loans and pledge of stock 
occurred between the bank and Francis B. Goeltz 
without any knowledge upon the part of the plaintiff, 
and the money realized from the loans was credited 
to the account of Francis B. Goeltz at said bank. These 
stocks had been wrongfully removed from Ure, Pett 
& Morris by Francis B. Goeltz, where they had been 
deposited by the plaintiff to her own account. 
Plaintiff discovered the facts surrounding the 
loans and pledge of stock much later, (R. 52,-53) and 
immediately upon discovery, went to the Bank and 
demanded her stock and indicated to the Bank that 
the pledge was entirely wrongful, (R. 53,-58) and 
that the signatures on the notes purporting to be hers, 
were in fact forgeries. ( R. 53-58) 
The bank refused to return the stock to her on 
demand. The plaintiff had in the interim sold the 
stock before she knew of its pledge to the bank, and 
b.ecause of the economic compulsion involved and 
the advice received from her economic adviser which 
had led to the sale, found herself in a position where 
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she could not otherwise meet her contractual obliga-
tion than by consenting to substitute other stock for 
the pledged stock which the bank required of her. She 
consented only under the pressure of the situation and 
because of the economic compulsion involved, and 
protested that the bank had no right to make such 
demand, and only upon the understanding with the 
bank that she reserved all rights in the stock and was 
allowing the bank to hold the stock only under pro-
test. This was fully understood by the bank . (R.51-
58) These stocks were Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
and Douglas Aircraft Co. stock. 
Thereafter the bank refused to retum the stock 
to the plaintiff, and indicated to her that they would 
sell the same to realize on the pledge to reimburse 
for the loans which had not been repaid. (R. 59) 
At the time a deposition was taken the plaintiff 
\Vas unable to locate her records of the deposit of the 
original stocks with Ure, Pett & Morris and refresh 
her memory concerning their deposit several years 
earlier with that brokerage, but indicated that she 
thought the stocks had been endorsed by her prior to 
being placed with Ure, Pett & Morris, although she 
expressed doubt that she had signed them all. 
Subsequently she located some old stock records and 
became convinced that she had not endorsed at least 
one of the certificates since it had been acquired 
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subsequent to the original deposit. She made a full 
and complete explanation of these circumstances to 
the court, and indicated that her best recollection 
therefore was that if her signature was on that 
particular stock certificate, that it had been placed 
there by someone else, and without her authorization. 
CR. 50) Subsequently the stock certificates involved, 
or photostatic copies thereof, where introduced, and 
two of the three bore signatures that in no way cor-
responded with the signature of the plaintiff, and 
· were, in fact, obvious forgeries, apparent to anyone. 
CR. 137, 138) One signature in all the documents 
involved was a bona fide signature of the plaintiff, 
· and was so patently different from the others as to 
leave no doubt as to the fact that they were not signed 
by the same person. Ex. 1, 2, 14, 15, 16. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The statute of Hmitations has no application to this case. 
11.. There was no error on the part of the Court in refusing to 
allow Defendant bank to amend its answer to plead the 
statute of limitations. 
Ill. Plaintiff was in no way estopped to deny the validity of the 
pledge of the Knickerbocker Fund stock. 
(A) The forgery on the other stock certificates 
pledged simultane·ously and the forgeries on the promissory 
notes were patent. 
(B) The trial court found against the defendant 
factually on the issue of notice as to defects in the trans-
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action, and that finding is not reviewable on this appeal 
as to sufficiency of evidence or facts upon which based. 
(C) The defendant bank was not an innocent party 
in this transaction entitled to rely upon the doctrine of a 
claimed estoppel. 
( D} The defendant failed to establish that it was 
a holder for value without notice of the Knickerbocker Fund 
certificate. 
(E) The Knickerbocker Fund certificate is not one of 
those in the possession of the defendant which plaintiff sued 
to recover. 
IV. There is no mer;t to appellant's contention that it had no 
notice of infirmity in the Knickerbocker Fund Certificate, nor in 
the assertion of this point on appeal. 
Point I. 
The statute of limitations has no application to this 
case. 
Plaintiff's complaint sets forth the fact that the 
stocks wrongfully retained by the defendant were 
the stocks which had been substituted, under protest, 
for the earlier and illegally pledged stocks. The 
complaint alleges that the demand by the defendant 
that such stocks be substituted was wrongful that the 
assertion by the bank that they would retain those 
stocks and not return them to the plaintiff was wrong-
ful, and that its refusal to return them to the plaintiff 
\vas wrongful, as were the threats to dispose of the 
stock to realize upon them as security. (R. 1-3) 
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The suit was for the specific purpose of recover-
ing from the defendant tl1e stocks which it held, that 
is, 6 shares of Douglas Aircraft Company Stock and 
25 shares of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company 
stock. 
The only way in which the stock formerly 
pledged wrongfully by Francis B. Goeltz appears in 
the _picture is by reason of the fact that a review of 
the circumstances surrounding the pledge of that 
stock was necessary in order to determine whether 
the defendant had a right to hold the substituted stock 
based upon its claim that the earlier stock had been 
rightfully pledged. The court found that the bank 
had no right to the original stock, hence it had no 
right to claim the subsequently acquired stock. 
The time element which is involved can only 
be measured from the date of the subsequent acquisi-
tion of stock, that is, the Douglas Aircraft and the 
Goodyear stock. Since that acquisition and deten-
tion was without right, based as it was upon the 
wrongful possession of the original stock, the subse-
quently acquired stock was also wrongfully acquired 
and wrongfully held, and the demand by the bank 
that the stock be pledged in exchange for the prior 
stock was wrongful, as was its subsequent retention 
by the bank and the refusal to return it. 
Thus, this was not a suit to recover stock in the 
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possession of a converter for a period in excess of the 
Statute of Limitations, but one for the return of 
stock wrongfully held for a briefer period, and based 
upon their wrongful act in requiring the deposit of 
the stock and their wrongful detention of it there-
after. No claim is made by the defendant that the 
Douglas and Goodyear stock had been held for a 
period in excess of the limitations period, nor is such 
the case. It is the subsequent wrongful dete11tion of 
that stock which is the issue of this case. 
In fact, the action could not be one for the re-
turn of the stock first wrongfully held by the bank, 
that is, the stock wrongfully pledged by Francis B. 
Goeltz, since that stock was returned to plaintiff 
under circumstances heretofore indicated. 
Defendant in its argument loses sight of the 
wrongful acts complained of in its argument seeking 
to date the period of limitations from an earlier 
wrongful act of detention of other stock. 
The defendant had no right to the original stock 
because of the fact of its wrongful pledge as found by 
the court, and since defendant had no right in the 
original stock, it had no right to demand of plaintiff 
that she substitute other stock, and no right to retain 
such other stock. The detention of the subsequent 
stock was a separate and distinct wrongful act, and 
one which plaintiff sued to establish and recover for. 
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The basis for examination into the original pledge 
was for the purpose of determining whether defend-
ant could rightfully insist upon the substitution of 
other stock and the retention of that stock. It has no 
basis whatsoever in the determination of the period of 
limitations. The true issue involved, that is, that 
defendant had no right to retain the subsequent stock 
was found factually in favor of the plaintiff. It was 
determined by the court that possession by the bank 
of the original stock was wrongful and that they were 
charged with notice of the defect in their holding, 
hence they· had no right to hold the stock later ac-
quired. 
Point II. 
There was no error on the part of the Court in refus-
ing to allow Defendant bank to amend its answer to 
plead the statute of limitations. 
Defendant makes much of the fact that there 
was a change in testimony of the plaintiff between 
the time of the taking of her deposition in this matter, 
and the time of trial. <i. It is true, that at the deposition 
Mrs. Goeltz testified that she had signed all three 
-~ certificates, she thought. She did express doubt that 
she had signed some stocks CDep. 22). She indicated 
.also, that it was only the stock in her original folio 
which she had received from an inheritan_ce which 
she had signed (Dep. 4, 5, 22). At that time she had 
not had the opportunity to review the old files and 
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records concerning the original deposit with Ure, 
Pett & Morris, to determine which stocks had been 
in the original folio. At the trial she made it entirely 
clear that an examination and search of her records 
on the subject revealed that at least one of the three 
stocks had not been in the original investment folio 
and hence had not been signed by her. (R. 50) She 
had no other source of reference at that time, and her 
testimony on this score was entirely substantiated by 
the stock c:~ertificates when they were produced. (R. 
134-138 Ex. 14, 15, 16) Two of the certificates were 
not signed by her, and had been no part of the 
original folio. 
The bank had full knowledge of the time at 
which Francis B. Goeltz had pledged the original 
stocks in security of a loan from that bank, hence the 
information was entirely available to the bank at all 
times from which it could and should have asserted 
its claimed defense of statute of limitations. Nothing 
about the testimony of the plaintiff at the time of the 
deposition lulled the defendant into failing to assert 
this defense. The plaintiff had no accurate informa-
tion as to exactly when Francis B. Goeltz pledged the 
stocks, even at the time of the filing of her complaint. 
This was information solely within the possession of 
the defendant bank so far as plaintiff was concerned. 
The statute of limita-tions as a defense was avail-
able to the defendant to plead as a bar, if it deemed 
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it applicable, at the time it filed its answer. Nothing 
about the testimony of plaintiff at the deposition 
changed that picture. The fact that plaintiff did 
or did not sign the stock certificates did not affect 
the defense of limitations which could ha~e been 
asserted by the defendant at the time of filing its 
answer. In fact, defendant raised the defense of 
laches and certainly had in mind this general prob-
lem at the time of filing its answer. 
There is absolutely nothing about the facts of 
this case which would in any was justify the inclusion 
of the defense of limitations after the trial of the case. 
The issue could and should have been raised in de-
fendant's pleadings well in advance of the trial in 
order the plaintiff have the opportunity of meeting 
the issue. Instead, the issue is sought belatedly to 
be raised after all of the evidence was in. 
Plaintiff feels that this issue of amendment to 
plead the Statute of Limitations is fairly represented 
by the following quotations from 34 Am. Jur. 351, 
Sec. 447: 
" ... where the defendant does not plead 
the statute of limitations, an order _made after 
the trial granting the parties the privilege 
of amending their pleadings to conform to the 
facts proved does not entitle the defendant t.o 
file an answer pleading the statute, and 1f 
filed, the court may strike such answer plead-
10 
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ing the statute, it appearing that the original 
did not amount to a pleading of the statute 
and was insufficient to furnish the basis for 
such an amendment." 
and at Section 448: 
'"In general, the refusal of permission to 
plead the bar of the statute of limitations by 
way of amendment to an answer already filed 
will not be regarded as an abuse of discretion, 
unless it is made to appear that the amendment 
will be in furtherance of justice. Because of 
the strict nature of this defense, it should be 
pleaded in the first instance, and allowed no 
grace of right thereafter, where it is claimed 
solely as a legal advantage; and hence, the 
refusal to allow an amendment pleading the 
statute of limitations is within the discretion 
of the court and will not ordinarily be 
disturbed." 
To like effect see City of St. Paul v. Bielenberg 164 
Minn. 72, 204 N.W. 544; Steiner v. Amsel, 18 Cal. 
2d 48, 112 P. 2d. 635. 
\ 
Certainly the furtherance of justice would not 
h~ve been served by allowing the defendant in the 
present instance to plead and rely upon the statute of 
limitations in the face of the fact that a patent 
forgery existed of which the defendant was charged 
with notice. 
The evidence of the forgery as characterized by 
11 
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the authority on the subject, Mr. Goddard, was such 
that anyone should have known of its being a forgery, 
without special training. Council for Defendant 
stipulated that Mr. Goddard would testify "anyone 
can see it." (R. 138) The defendant has failed 
completely and utterly to indicate in any way what-
soever how the interests of justice will be advanced 
and aided by his being allowed to belatedly impose 
this asserted defense. 
Practically, the belated effort to insert the statute 
of limitations as a defense after all evidence on both 
sides had been introduced stemmed from the fact 
that defendant after hearing the evidence and 
observing the exhibits realized the futility of its posi-
tion relative to any substantive defenses in the case, 
and seized upon the statute of limitations as a last 
straw, belated defense to the inevitable. 
Certainly the factual picture here involved, that 
is, an innocent plaintiff and a defendant charged 
with knowledge, as found by the court, does not 
justify the reversal of the trier of facts on the basis 
of an abuse of discretion, which is necessarily the test 
required to be met. 
It is respectfully submitted, that the defendant 
showed no ground for the amendment of his answer 
to justify the same in the furtherance of justice; that 
in fact no such justification exists; that plaintiff 
12 
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established on the contrary an obvious and patent 
forgery observable to the untrained as well as the 
trained person; that rlefendant was chargefl with 
knowledge of the forgery, and could not blind itself 
to that forgery; that defendant was bound thereby 
and wrongfully demanded a substitution of stocks 
and a wrongful detention of the same, and that 
plaintiff is entitled to the return of the same. That 
the defendant has a judgment against the true wrong-
doer-Francis B. Goeltz, and should be required to 
pursue that debtor. 
Point III 
Plaintiff was in no way estopped to deny the 
validity of the pledge of the Knickerbocke·r Fund stock. 
There are several reasons why the argument 
of the defendant at point three of its brief is without 
merit, which reasons are hereinafter treated as sub-
divisions hereof. 
(A). The forgery on the other stock certificates pledged 
simultaneously and the forgeries on the promissory notes 
were patent. 
One basis upon which the defendant in this case 
is stripped of any right or ability to claim the benefit 
of the Knickerbocker Fund stock certificate which 
bore the signature of Marian Story Goeltz, is the man-
ner in which the possession of that certificate was 
obtained. 
13 
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This is well illustra_ted by the colloquy between 
court and counsel CR. 123), wherein the court said: 
Court: ". . . But if he brings in three 
of them and one we say is a forgery, does that 
one apple spoil the whole basket?" 
Mr. Billings: "I would say it did, if the 
forgery was so apparent as to put us on notice 
on those two." 
Actually, the factual picture is much more favor-
able to the plaintiff than even this statement, since 
the signature on the notes were patent forgeries-
characterized as very crude by Mr. Goddard (R. 86) 
and "obvious" CR. 88), and the testimony of Mr. 
Goddard as stipulated by counsel (R. 138) with 
reference to the forged signatures on the stock certif-
icates "that anyone can see it," and the l(nickerbocker 
signature was/ genuine signature. 
In view of this testimony and stipulation, it is 
difficult to see how the defendant can now claim the 
benefit of that pledge, obtained as it was in conjunc-
tion with obvious·forgeries. 
(B) The trial court found against the defendant factual-
ly on the issue of notice as to defects in the transaction, 
and that finding is not re·viewable on this appeal as to 
sufficiency of evidence or facts upon which based. 
The trial court found that the defendant was 
charged with notice of the forgery of plaintiff's name 
14 
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on the other stock certificates and promissory notes. 
The defendant made no objection to the findings as 
entered by the trial court below, at which time he 
could have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, 
the form of the finding, or the legal propriety thereof. 
He did none of these things. Nor did the defendant 
see fit to set out in his statement of points in this case 
any point challenging this or other findings so that 
a review thereof might be had. This it was obliged 
to do under Rule 7 5 (d), since there was not a designa-
tion for inclusion of the complete record and all pro-
ceedings. Nor did the defendant see fit to raise the 
issue of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
findings by any designation of such an issue in its 
brief. 
Respondent therefore takes the position that the 
bank has no issue before the court under this state-
ment of point relied upon which is reviewable in any 
way in which the bank could be gran~ed any relief. 
(C) The defendant bank was not an innocent part in 
this transaction en_titled to rely upon the doctrine of a 
claimed estoppel. 
The defendant was not an innocent party in the 
present case. The court made an express finding 
that the defendant was charged with notice, as indi-
cated above. The fact that the bank was not an in-
nocent party has been established, and that issue is 
15 
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at rest for the reasons heretofore indicated under (B) 
abpve. 
The very case relied upon by the defendant and 
quoted at length in its brief at page 21, Adams v. 
Silver Shield Min. & Co., 82 Ut. 586, 21 P. 2d 886, 
which incidentally held against the claimed holder 
for value, and hence against the position of the de-
fendant in the present case, indicates in the quotation 
used by the defend.ant in its brief, the basis for estop-
pel in a proper case, that is: "Where one of two inno-
cent people must suffer, the true owner, by delivering 
the certificate indorsed in blank has enabled the third 
party to perpetrate the wrong and therefore should 
be estopped from asserting his ownership." 
Since the bank was not an innocent party to the 
transaction by which it came into the possession of 
the Knickerbocker certificate, it is not entitled to the 
benefit of any estoppel as against the true innocent 
party in the proceedings, that is, the plaintiff. 
In the case of Malia v. Giles, (Utah), 114 P. 2d 
208, a case wherein the husband had pledged stocks 
belonging to his wife in security of his obligation and 
had forged her signature thereon, the court held 
that the pledgee could not rely upon such a- pledge 
since husband could acquire no authority· to forge 
his wife's name. Likewise here, the bank cannot rely 
upon forged signatures, arid with notice of the forged 
.16 
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signatures rely upon a single valid signature in a 
tainted transaction. 
(D) The defendant failed to establish that it was a 
holder for value without notice of the Knickerbocker 
Fund certificate. 
Before the defendant could prevail in any event 
on a theory of estoppel, it would be incumbent upon 
defendant to establish affirmatively that it was a 
bona fide holder for value without notice. of defects. 
This is an affirmative burden which the defendant 
was bound to sustain. West Coalinga Oil Field Corp. 
v. Robinson, (Cal.), 194 P. 2d 554; Thomas v. Atkins, 
52 F. Supp. 405; Bank of U. S. v. Cooper Business 
Corp., 261 N.Y. S. 687; First National Bank v. Van 
Horn, 2 S. W. 2d 333. 
Defendant not only failed to sustain such a 
burden, but to the contrary, the findings of the court 
were against the defendant on this issue. 
(E) The Knickerbocker Fund certificate is not one of 
those in the possession of the defendant which plaintiff 
sued to recover. 
Much of what has been said under Point I, is 
applicable to the argument which respondent makes 
at this point. That is, the bank does not have posses-
sion of the Knickerbocker stock, the suit was for the 
recovery of the Goodyear and Douglas Aircraft stocks, 
17 
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and the assertion of this claim by the defendant at 
this point loses sight of the true nature of the suit. 
IV. There is no .merit to appellant's contention that 
it had no notice of infirmity in the Knickerbocker Fund 
certificate, nor in the assertion of this point on appeal. 
. What has . been said with reference to point III 
heretofore provides a complete answer to Point IV 
. of appellant's brief, and reference thereto is made, 
. particularly in answer to the argument as to whether 
there is a dissimilarity in the signatures sufficient to 
. put a person of affairs on notice. Point III (A). The 
testimony there set out and the balance of the testi-
mony :givel} by Mr. Goddard certainly removes any 
, doubt in :this _respect, as does even a casual examina-
tion of the questioned documents. 
What has been said at point III (B) and CC) 
of respondent's brief with respect to the fact that the 
findings in this matter are at rest, is also applicable 
to point IV sought to be raised by the appellant, and 
is also conclusive of this issue, and provides a full and 
complete answer to it. 
As an answer to the assertions of counsel that 
there is no evidence but that defendant treated the 
pledged stock as that of plaintiff's husband, it does 
not appear that this is a matter which could or should 
be determinative of the case. However, far from 
indicating t.hat the defendant treated the pledged 
18 
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stock as that of the husband, the affidavit of the Vice-
President of the bank in support of a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment in this case certainly indicates to the 
contrary, as do par. 1 of Defendant's first Counter-
claim, par. 1 of its Second Counterclaim and par. 1 of 
its Third Counterclaim, and the prayer for relief 
against the plaintiff. (R. 6, 7, 8.) 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
after having carefully followed the evidence in this 
case and the exhibits thereof, made its findings and 
decision based upon a fully sustainable view of the 
case, and a correct view of the case. That none of 
the points raised by the appellant on this appeal have 
merit. That the case does complete and substantial 
justice to all parties, as decided by the trial court, and 
places the burden upon the bank to proceed against 
the proper culprit for the collection of the money 
he owes the bank, and it relieves a totally innocent 
party and protects her rights. The appellant has 
failed to attack the findings of the court on any of 
the issues that are involved, that those findings thus 
are the law of the case, and the defendant is bound 
by them, and that the judgment should be affirmed 
by this court. 
Respectfully submitted 
OWEN, WARD, SHEFFIELD 
and GREENWOOD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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